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The Social  Li fe of Automata
Karl Sigrnund
Ags'rR- lcrr ' .  This is  a survel .  of  recent  resul ts orr  the evolut ionar l 'd1 'namics
of  cooperat ion.  Based orr  the Pr isoncr 's  Di lemrna Clarne.  evolut ionarv chron-
icles shon' the ernergence of coopt:rati"'o. crror-proof strategies like PaVloY or
C'ontr i te ' l ' i t  For Tat .  Such strategies c lescr ibe socia l  r rorrns.  Änotht : r  c iass of
moclels deals rv i th indirect  reciproci t r ' :  here,  the return of  an al t ru ist ic  act ion
can be due to a th i rd part r ' .  Again.  st rategi( .s  basecl  on c l iscr iminat iorr  can
er.olve and lead to cooperation.
1. Introduction
Sorrre of thc rnajor transitions in evolution occurred onlv once. and others
se\reral t imes (c/. \{avnard Smith and Szathrrrärv, 1995). Eusocial colonies, fbr
instance. emerged repeatedl], amon€! bees. arrts. termltes. and aphids. This allo.'r,s
onc to compare the importance of cliffererrt factors, for instarrcc ccological opportu-
nities. l i fe historl ' traits. genetical stnictures etc. and even to prerlict u,here similar
societies are l ikelv to be found (as Richard Alexander did in arrticipating the steri le
norker caste of the nakecl rriole-rat. sec'Sigrnrrncl. 1995). In r:ontrast, no parallel
to hum:rn societies is knou,n in thc historv of cvolutioni \1'c seerrr to be uniclue in
having achievcd a social structure clistirrguishetl (i) bv the levell ing of rerprodur:-
tive opportunities, (i i) b1. the prevalence of clivision of labour. rnutual help and
economic exchange betrveen non-related irrclivicluals. (iii) bv inforrnatlon transfer
based on language and (i i ') b1' moral obligations both extcrnallr 'enforced througlr
group sarrctions and irrtcrrralized through po$,erful errrotiorrs.
\\'e carr. of course. Iearrr rnuch about the cultural rletcrnrirrarrts of human soci-
eties b1' comparing tribes. clans. states and gangs: but all these are manifestatlons
ci f  a  universal 'humarr  naturc 'caused bt-a major  b io logical  t ransi t ion th ich.  ap-
parentll-, has occurred once onlr'. In orcler to anall'ze the mechanisms responsit)le
for it, ',ve have to use thought experirnents.
Game theorl 'u,as devisecl explicit ly'as a tool for the social sciences. It nas
rrieant to model the inclependent decision-making process of interactirrg indivirluals.
each bent upon the 'selfish' goal of rnaxirrrizirrg his clr her o\\-n pa)-off. Interpreting
pavoff as reprocluctive {itness provicles a good tool for stuclr-ing indir.idual selection
based on Darv"'inian (:ompctition. But for dccades. game th('or\' $'as harldicappcd
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b1' thc f ic t ior r  of  t l re ' rät ional  p larTr ' .  c icspi t< ' th< ' fact  t i la t  rnäl r \ '< '< 'onornis t -s .  a l rd
cver1. psvcüologist. krreiv lrctttr ' . Furtlrt 'rniore. it 'r-as onlv u-ircrr biologists starte<l
to use game theon- that populatiorrs of irr<livirluals 'r 'crt '  r 'onsicle'r 'r:<1 (scc \Iavnarrl
Smith. 1982. Birrrnore. 1992. \\ 'cibull. 1995. Hoflrauel an<l Signmnrl. 1998).
Thc a<lr'cnt of cr'olutionafv garne theorv has <'hangerl all this. Inclir-iclual plar'-
crs were no longer assunrercl to br: ratiorral. lrut to follon' sirlrplc'. knee-j<'rk nrlr 's. Lr
thc spirit of Ricliard Dan'kins (1976). n']xr cl:rinrs that ur,i irc nrc're rolrots. plavers
u,ure therefbre rlorlellerl lx- sirrrple :lutoln:lta. Popul:rt ions of suc'h irrterar:t ing :iu-
tomata. engagecl in tht' massivclv piirallcl kirrd of problcrrr-solving c:hara<'tcristir: of
Dar.,r ' inian errrlution. .,r 'ere stuclieci bv rneans of computer sirrurlatiotrs or niathemat-
ical analt 'sis folloning their erxrlutiorr fbr rrrarrr-gencratiorrs. \eri-strategi<'r-ariants
(or prograrns) rverr: introrlucccl either lrr-ran<kun plo('css('s or lrv harrrl. arrrl tcstc<l
agairist t l ie currcnt conrpositiorr of the populatiorr. \orrl inear clvuarrrir:s t lcscrilr ing
thc resulting a<laptation or selection pfocesses. n'ere userl to analr'zethc r:lrrorricles
of  these ar t i f ic ia l  sor : ie t ies (s i :e .  e.g. .  - \xe l ror l .  1997).
This program of er-olutionar\- game theorr- has bee.n applied to a u-iclt '  r 'arietr- of
biological ancl (more rec'entlr ') ec'onclmic'topir:s. In this papel'. s'e sketr:]r sonrc rocclrt
clevelopnicnts in ont: parti<'ularlr '  a<'t irr '  f iclrl: the e'r 'olution of coopcration. \Iorc
preciselr'. u'c <leal q'ith onc of t irc t lrrcc fact,,rs.ulrr.rit lv l.r ' ,gtrizc<l as cssential.
namel)' r. ith rei: iprocitr '. This is not meAnt to <lon.nplal the irnpoltarrcc of thc
other tu.o factors. ulz. relateclness (Hanriltorr. 196i3) arrrl group selection (\\ ' i lson
ancl Sobcr. 199-1). Dorrbtkrsslr 'ciosc kinship ti i 's. the ruajor lrasis of cooperatiorr irr
clorres and bee coloniers. clir l prrevail in ea.rlr '  horrrirri<l groups. Furthelrrrore. group
sclection ruore preciselr'. t ire irrclir-iclual sc'lcctirr- arlvarrtagc rlut'to lrckrrrgirrg to a
successful group u.as esserrtial. lrecause th<'rrra.jor t l irci its to srrrr-ir ' ;r l \rerc lnost
l ikclv coming fioni rival groups. This bcirrg sairl. lct us t 'urrr to tl lc subjcct of
reciprocal altmisrn. origintrl lr-introclr-r<'ecl irr a larrrlniark päper lrv Trir-t 'rs (1971)
q,hich. to tir is rlar-. servcs as al irrsl, i i ;rf iorr to the fielt l.
2. Reciprocal Altruism and the Prisoner's Dilernrna
Assume tirat in ati crrcountcr l letu-ccn tu'o plavers. one is a pot<'ntia1 tlonor an<l
thc otirer a recipient. Thc clonor carr givc ht' lp th:it the recipient neeris. Gii-irrg hclp
costs -( 'to the <lonor arrrl vielcls par'off b to th<'r<.ci1>icnt (ri ' i th thc pnvoff irrterpreted
as Darr'", inian fitness. ri.r:. rcproduc'ti lc srrcccss. ancl nssurrring 0 < c < 0). .\ccor<lirrg
to Hilrrri l tori 's rule. it n' i1l piir- to ht' lp if thc <lcgrt c of rcl;rtcrhrcss r bets'een rlonor
arrd recipierit (1.c. thc probabil itv that a ran<lorrrlv choscrr gcnc Ii 'orrr th<'ckrnor älscr
belorrgs to the recipient's gt:nomt') is larger tlrarr the cost-to-lrenefit ratit.rrr. Lr:.
r > c' lb.
(Sirrcc r'( 1/2 underr ncirrnal circurnstarr<'es barring itkrnticti l  tu-ins or lr igh irr-
breedirrg this conclit ion r<'quires c < bl2). Do<'s this irrrplr- that clrrc ,shoulrl rrever
hr:lp an unrelated inrl ir. idual' l  \ot so. ar:corrl ing to Trir-cls. if there is a reasonali le
chance that the recipicrrt is able to feturn th<'hclp. This is t lre plinr' lpler of rercipro-
cal altruisrn in Trir.crs' dcfinit ion. 'the trarl irrg of altruistic acts in ri 'hich lrerrefit
is  larger  than cost .  so that  o\ 'or : r  p< ' r io<l  of  t i r r rc  br i th  cnj rx 'ä  net  g: r i r r '  (Tr iv t rs .
1985.  p.  361) .  Accorr l i r rg lv . ' rc '< ' ipro<'a l  a l tmisrn is  cx l i t '< ' t r '< l  to  < ' r 'o l r - r ' rv l ien t 'o
iricl ividuals associatt ' long crrougir to t:rt: lntnqr, r 'olts ftt:qrLt'nfl 'q;is poterrtial altnrist
antl recipierrt ' .
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This. hoq-ever. opcns thc cloor to unilaterral cicfcction. Suppose that irr trvct
consecuti ' , 'e rounrls. thc plavers exc:hange the rolcs of clonor and recipicrrt. If both
help each other. both obtairr b - c. This is higher than thc pa\'off 0 obtairred if both
refrain from irelpirig. But is one help-s and the other docs not. t l ierr t i ic helper is
left with the costs of his ar:t. -c. arrrl the rccipi<-.nt gets alr,ar'$' ith b points. This
is just the rank orderring of thc pavoff r 'alues for the Prisori<.r"s Dilenrma. u']rich
liad bccrr stucliecl for man.n. l.ears lrv garrrc thcorists ancl experinrcrrtal ps"'chologists.
The cliffcrence is rnerelv that botl i playrrs ha'"'c to dcr:icle sinrultancousl"'n.irether to
cr ioperate (p la1 'C) or  to  c lefect  (p lar-D).  I f  both p la l -C.  both receive the renarc l
-R for mutual cooperation; if both plav D. both rcceivc the punishmerrt P: and if
rtne defects unilaterallr ' . he receives tl ic tclrrptatiorr I n,i iereas tl ic other plaver is
left nith tl ic suckcr's pavoff,S. For the Prisorrer"s Dilcrrrna game. it is assunteci
that
T > R > P > . 9  a u c l  2 R > T + 5 .
The first conclit iorr irnplies tirat the rlorninant option is to plav D: it vields a l i ighcr
pavoff. no matter rvhat the other p1:r1'cr is choosirrg. hr the <lonor-re<'ipient 
€lanle
(rvith trvo rouncls in aiternating roles). one ltas T : b. R : b- c'. P : 0 ancl S : -c.
so that t irese inequalit ies arc triviall l '  satisfi i :<I.
The corrclusion seerns incscapablc that if t l ic interaction is riot repcated. <:o-
opcration carrnot emer€le. It turns out. rathcr surprisirrglr '. that t l i is con<:lusion is
prenrature. But'n'e nil l  rcturn tci this point orrlf in thc corrclucling discussi<in
our aim herc is rathcr to follorv Trivers irr assuniing tirat indir-icluais expcricnire . orr
average. ser.eral intcrac'tions.
Let us supposc. thcrr. that thc garue is repeatetl n-ith a constiurt probabil it l- 'ur.
Tire number of rounds is a ranclorn r,aritrble rvith expected ltrlut- ' (1 - t) 1. Tire
tota l  pa1'of f is  g iven b1 ' ! - -1, ,ur" .  u , i th  - { , ,  as pavof f in  the n- th rourrc l  arrc l 'u"  t } re
probabil itv for the rr-th rourrd to occur. In the l irnit ing casc i l : 1 (the lnfinitelv
i teratec l  game) one uses as pavof f  the l inr i t  i r r  the mean.  i .e .  ( - { t  +. . .  * ,4 , , ) fn
(provided it exists). If tr ' is suffir ' l*ntlv large,. there exlsts (in ( 'olitrast to thc one-
shot garne) no strateg\-nhir:ir is bcst against all corners (s*'.\xclrocl. 198-1). For
ar > (7 - R)lQ - P). for instarrr:e. thr-- bcst replv agairrst -{/u:oysC is to ahvavs
defect. u,hereas against Grrirn (thc stratcgv that cooperatos up to thc first t ime
that it is been exploitecl. and fi 'om thtn onq'arcls i l lnar-s defe<:ts) it is best to allr.avs
cooperate.
In a series of round robin tourntrnrcnts. Axelroil found tl izit the simplcst strat-
r-.g1' subrnittecl. narnelv TFT. finishecl f irst. Furthtrrnore. Axelrocl and Harrri ltorr
(1981) r:xplort:cl the errrergcrrr:c of cooperatiorr in crri lr ' lng populatiorrs of piavers.
Lr particular. ther- shorved that the tu'o strategii 's --l lu'a;qsD arrcl TFT (the Tit For
Tat strategl that coopcratps in thc fir 'st rouncl trrrcl f i 'oni then on alu'avs rcpcats
the previous move of the co-plaver) are irr bistable equil ibriurri: nclne of therrr carr
irrvade ti ie othcr. But as soon as the frequcn<:r' of TFT plar-ers cxccc(ls a cortain
tlrreslrold (given bv c(l- 'u:)lu(b-c) irr thc <loriors-rec'ipient game). keeps grou'ing.
For largc valucs of u-'. this thresholrl is vcrl 'srnall. This mearrs that a srriall clustcr
of TFT plavers carr irrr.ade a populatiorr of clefectors: thc fen' intcrac't icins q'it l i  their
l ike rnore tharr cornperrsate their loss agairrst t ire. residcnt niajcirin' of defectors.
One mar- not c:onclucle, horrever. that a population rlonrirratecl lrr- TFT can resist
invasion bv all comers. This irecorncs particularlr ' obr-ious if n'c take into accourrt
the possibil i tv for crrors. lvhicli must ahvavs be present in realistic situatiorrs. In
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fact. the interaction bet'w,een tq'o TFT plar.ers is particularl"-sensitivc to noise. One
wrong move causes a 'w'hole chain of alternating defections. One furtlicr mistake carr
leacl back t,o rnutual cooperation. but just as u,ell to mutual defection. The average
payoff rlecreases drasticaliv. Olrviouslr'. the trvo plavers should be able to forgive
occasionall l '  not according to a regular pattern. for this could bc exploited, but
rather  orr  a rat r r lonr  basis .
This leads to stochastic strategies. \Ve often do not use hard ancl fast rules irr
our every'dal' interactioris. but ar<: guided bv factors rvhicir arc dif l icult to prerlict.
and lvhich result in a stronger or n'eaker propensity' to opt for this move or that
(\iav. 1987). With TFT. this propensitv is 100 percent or 0 percent. deperr<ling on
wtrether the co-pla1'er cooperate(l in the previous rouncl or not. \\: i th an error rate
of 1 percent. TFT cooperates u,ith 99 or rrith 1 percent probabil itv.
3. Evolutionary Chronicles
Let us conslcler t l i is in a more gerreral settirrg. In each rouncl. there are 4
possible outcomes. leading to 4 clifferent pavoff 'n.alues. If u'e assume that each
outcorne determines the next move of the plaler. this 1-ields 16 diffcrcnt strategies
(32 if we in<:lude the first move). If u,e allorv in additiorr stochastic strategics u,ith
a larger or smaller propensitv to cooperate. r\,e obtain a 4-dirnensional spacc of
st rategies g iven b1 'quadruples (pn, I ts .pr .pr , )  rv l tere p;  is  the probabi l i t r - to  p lar '
C after outconie i. \\'e can use a conrputer to firrcl the most successful strategl'.
b1. introducing occasionalll' a small rninoritr- of a ne',r'. randorrrll' chosen strateg].
into the population and rratcrhing ho'n'its frcqucrrcl 'develops under the influerrce
of selcr:t ion. If ne run this for a sufficicntl l ' long time. \1'e can test a largi: sample
of strategies.
Such rnutation-selection chrorricles clcpi:n<l on contingencies. arrcl can take r.cn'
different patirs. but thcv frcquentll leacl to a populatiorr riorninated bv the so-
called Par.lov strategr' (1.0.0. 1) the strategv that cooperates if antl orrlv if. in the
prer,ious round. the co-plaver usccl the sarrre rrrove as oneself (Not'ak and Sigrrrurrcl.
1993). This strategr- emboclies a sirnpie 'n' irr-star'. lose-shift rule: it repeats the
former move if the pavoff u.as high (7 or /?) and su'itches tcl ther alternativc move
if the pa1''off u,as lo'nr, (i.e. P or S). Arguabh-. this is tire simplest le'arning rule.
Par'lov seems a hopeless strategl' for inr.adirig an -,l luaysD population. since it
gets suckered everv secon<l round. In fact. it nceds a retaliatorl. strateg)' l ike TFT
or Grim (the strategv tl iat cooperates urrti l  suckered. antl from then on never
coopcrates). Once such 'nice' stratcgies (strategies that are rrot thc first to defect)
have takcn over. Pavlov can inr.acle. becausc it is tolerant to errors. If tg'o Pavlor.
plavers are engaged in a repeatetl PD garne. and one of thern contrnits a mistake
and ciefects. then both plal 'crs wil l defect in the next round tlte'sinner"becausc
he is happv u'ith his T arrd rcpeats the former mnve. thc 'sucker' because he shifts
to the other option. As a result. both plar-ers obtain the lorv pavoff P. sn'itch
again arid therebv resume mutr:al cooperation. In ad<lit ion to beirrg tolerant to
errors. Pa:r'lo.,' has also the aclvantage of being irrtolerant to -{lu:ay.sC plavers. After
a rnistaken defection against such a plaver. Par'lor. keeps clefectirrg. Therefor<r.
irrdiscriminate altmists cannot spread in a Par.lor.populatiorr (u'hereas thev c:ould
spread b1-neutral drift in an TFT population). As a result. defectors fincl no easr'
victims. Thev onlr. find Par'lor'-pla1,ers. rvhom thev carr explciit in ever)' secori<l
rouncl (obtaining (7 + P)12 in the mean). 'n'hereas Par'lor.pla1'ers obtain -R against
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each other. As long as 2A > T + P or. in the case of thc donor-recipierrt garnc.
as long as c <bf 2 a Pavlov population is stable against invasion.
4. Social Norms
Horv can one formulate tliis kincl of stabilitl'? The usual approach noulcl tre to
test for evolutionaril l 'stabil itr '(c/. Nlavnard Srnith, 1982). It can easil) 'be shor'" 'n.
horvel'er. that in the context of repeated gamcs. suclr strategies clo not exist. Irr
particrrlar. neither TFT nor ,l ' tuaysD are cvolutionariir- stable. although this has
occasionallv beerr clairned. Possibll '  the niost appropriate notion in this context is
that cif a limit evolutiorrarill. stable strategl'. This u'as originallv formulated irr terms
of extensive games (Seltcn. 1975). but fbr repeated garnes. it is rnore appropriate to
formulate it in terms of strategies implemented b1'finite automata (Leimar. 1997) .
In each rouncl. sucli an autorrraton can be in one of rn interrral states. Depending
on tire state, it plal 's C or D; ancl depending on tire outcolne of this round. it
su,itches to the next state. Irr order to test rvhether sucir a strateg].is a l imit ESS.
orre assumes that it plar.s against a cop]' of itself. and looks at rvhat happens at
ever)' outconrc. If the sequence of rnoves prescribecl br- t ire strategi' is bcttcr than
anv alternative. then tire stratcgy' is a l imit ESS: it is alu'avs disadvantageous to
clg'iatc from it. In fact, a l imit ESS is a social norm: if evervboclv adheres to it. i t
u 'oul , l t r ' l  r lo  not  to  r lo .
/ \ , ^ -
( * (  c  )
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Frc t t n r  1 .  TFT  i s  no t  a  no rm.
Let us consider this for TFT. \\'c rnav vie'lv the internai state as definccl bv the
orltconle R,.9.7 or P of the prcvious round. Thc action rule is to plav C aftcr A
and Z. Fig. 1 sliows a graph q'hose verticcs are the four states (tl ie move on top
is that ltv the plaver, the ntove belos,that lrv t l ie co-plaver). The full arrorv shou,s
the transition to the next statc. if the plaver uses the tnove prcscribed bv TFT:
the broken arrou' shorvs the transition if the plavt r uses the altcrnative mo', 'e. This
holtls uncler thc assumption that thc othetr plaver sticks to TFT. \\ 'c scc that in the
state S. it s'oulcl be bctter to follo"r, thc brokerr arro\v: the pavoff for thr: next t\\,-o
rnoves is 2-R. u'hich is larger than T + S. \\ e shoulcl note that in principle, the state
S should never be reached in a game betr,veen two TFT plar.ers. But according
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to tlre trr:rnbling fuanrl dor:trine of Selten (1975). it i 'an be reached if orre plaver
rnisirrrplemcnts his rnove. a mistake t 'hich rnar'happerr n'it ir a srnall. but positive
prcibabil itr ' .
If n'c studv thc sanre situation for Par-kx-. l 'e olrtain the grapli of Fig. 2 (again
assurrring the co-pla1-er to use Pär'lor'). I l  2R > T + P it is best to fcrl lorv the fLrl l
arro\vs. i.e. Par' lov is a l irnit trSS. if 2R <T + P. it is bctter. q' iren in state P. to
deviate frorn th<: Par' lor.nrkr anrl ulav D. hr this casc. Pa\' lov is not a l irnit ESS.
a a--\/ t(* f  c )  '  r
' "  
\ t - /
Ftt ; t 'Rr .  2.  Ptr r ' lov is  a r ro l r r  i l  2R > T + P.
It is easr-to firrrl automata tl iat are ahvavs nolnls and leaci to cooperation. Let
us consider the Iolloü'ing cxanrplc. l 'hich has tlrrcc statcs anri starts irr statr'1. In
state 1 or 2. it plai-s C. ancl in state 3 it plar-s D. The transition tzrble is given br'
Table 1. Asain. it is easv to check that it is bcst to aln'als follon'the full arrolr,.









This strategr" becornes ler] ' transparerrt if orre iriterprerts it as Contrite Tit For
Tat (cTFT. orlginallr-introclucecl bl Sugtlen. 1986). It is bäsec1 on the notion of
a startdirtg assoc'iatccl to o:rch plavcr. u'hic'h carr bc a (good) or ü (bad). hr each
rourrcl. the plaver ac'ts (1.e. opts fbr C or D) arrcl olrtains a ne\\ 'stancling nhich
clepends on that a('t ion and on the prer-ious stancllng clf both piavcrs. Tlie rulcs for
upclatirrg the stanclirrg tire the follori ' ing: if the <'o-plaver has bcc'rr in goocl starrdirig.
or if both have irecrr irr ba<l starr<ling. orrc rcc'eives a goocl stanrling if one cooperates.
arrcl a bad stan<ling othcrrvisc. If onc has bc<-.n in good stan<ling an<l the co-plaver
in ba<l stzrrrrl ing. one receives a good starrrl ing rro rnatterrn-hat one rloes.
Thus if one cooperates in a giverr rouncl. one rvil l  aln'ar-s obtain a goocl stancling:
but if one clefec:ts. one rl, i l l  be' in goocl standing orrlr- if ther clefer:t ion has bccn
'prorrrkurf i.e. if clner hzis been in goocl stanrling anci t ire opponent in bad standing.
cTFT is thc strategv rvhicir coopcratcs cxccpt if the plar.er is in goorl starrding
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Ftc; t ' tu ;  3.  cTFT is  a r rorrn.
othcru'ise. A plavcr u'ho ciefects lx' rnistake krrot-s that hc lost his good stancling.
and rnccklv accepts punishment. ri.e. keeps <'ooperating t,r 'en if thc other plaver uses
D on hirn.
In other rvords. cTFT begins rvit l i  a <'ooperativc nlove. ancl coopcratcs cxcept
if pror.okcd (or bv mistake). If trr 'o plar-ers usirrg this stlategr-engage in a repeatecl
Prisorrer's Dilcrnma. ancl onc plav'r ckrfect-s ix' rnistakc. thcn ]rc loscs his goorl
stancling. In the next rouncl. he rl ' i l l  cooperato. u'he'reas the other plaver n-i l l  cleI'ect
t ' i thout losirrg his goo<l st:rnding. Frorn thcn orr both plavers n'i l l  be in gclod
standirrg again and resume their mutual coopcratiun in the fir lkx'ing roun<I.
This is exactlv the stratcgr- intlr lctrrerrted bv tirc pr<.r-iorrslr ' t lcscriltecl aLttonra-
ton:  the state 1 < 'orresponcls to l roth p laver  being in  thc sarr rc  s tanr l i r rg.  thc statc
2 occurs'n'hcn the p1a1'err is in goorl starrrl irrg ancl the co-plar-r:r not. an<l state 3
is.just t lrc mirror irnage ot'2. Hcncc,cTFT is :r rrolln. arrcl therefbre urrirn'adablc.
\loreover. it is itself as aclcpt at invatl ing a population of clt ' fcctors as TFT: it c:arr
<;nlv bc suckerercl in t lre first rourr<l. ancl rt ' tallates fionr thcrr orr. \ loreor-cr. it is
irrrrrrutte against mistake:s of iniplernentatiorr.
Hou,ever. irr corrtrast to Pavkx-. cTFT is r-ulrrt,rable'to ('rrors in per<'eption (c/.
Bocrli jst r:t a1,.. 1997). A plär-t 'r erroneouslr-bclit 'r ' ing to have been suck<'rt 'd rvil l
plar-D. Frcinr then on. both cTFT plalers u'i l l  rcrrrairr irr statt '2 arr<l koep punishing
tl ieir co-plaver in goorl faith. -\nother u'eak point of cTFT is that it <locs rrot exli loit
-{/uraiTsC-plavers. u'}to t}rerefbre carr sprcacl x'rreutral clrift antl therelx'opcrr thc
cloor to defectors. In Sigmurrcl cl nl. (1998) it is argucd that the investigation of
strategies irnplemente<l 1x- autorrrata shoulcl takt' account of rrristakos irr y.rclcr'ption
just as u'cll as of rnistakes itr irnplcrricrrttrt iorr. Giverr t lrat t lre rrurrrltcr clf rrornrs
is extreurelv large (s"e Linrlgrcrr. 1991. arrcl Lt' irnar. 1997). it is <liff icult to prerlict
n'hich stratcsies $'i l l  eventuallr '  be selectccl.
5. Inclirect Reciprocity
So fär. rve have dcsr:ribed clirr '<'t rt 'c:ipro<ratiorr. ^\lexanck'r has suggesterl that
another. indirect rec'iprocatiorr is also opcrating irr hunrarr societies. arr<l that it
is t l ic basis of all rnoral s1-sterrrs. In fäc't. irrclirec:t recipro<:itr ' \\-as rnentiorrcd br-
Trivers (1971) as 'gcnt:raliseri altruisrrr': t lrt 'retrtrn clf atr trltmistic act is clirected
to'n'artls a thir<l partr-. ' Irr<li l iduals ... ma)'resporrd to arr altnristic act that benefits
theniselves br- acting altruisticallv tou'ar<l a thirt l in<lir-i<lual urrirn'olved in the init ial
in teract ion. . .  In  a s \ -s tet r  of  s t rong nru l t ip : r r t r - in teract iorrs .  i t  is  possib le that
in sornc situations irrclivicluals are sek'r 'tcrl to rle'rnonstrtrte serreralise'cl a truistir:
tcnclcncies.' This posslbil i tv is further stressecl irr Tr' lr '<,rs (1985). s'ho explores the
possibil i tr- that a serrse of fäirness rnal cr'olvc ' irr species suclr as ours in u'hich
zr s1'stem of rnulti-part1' altruisrrr rrav otr)crAt(' su<:ir that arr in<lir-ir lual rlocs rrot
1.10 K,\RL SIG\I I , IND
nccessarily recei\re reciprocal benefit from ther inclividual aided but mav receive thc
return frorn third parties.'
Richarcl Alexander extended this idea under the heading of irrdirect reciprocitr ' '
(see Alexarrder, 1979 and 1986). \Vith indirect reciprocity'. olre does not expect a
return frorn the recipient (as n'ith direct reciprocitr '). but frorn someone else. Coop-
eration is therebv channeled tou'ards the cooperative menrbers of tlie contmunitl'. A
donor provides help if the recipient is i ikell to hclp others. or at least if he has not
been observercl withholding help. According to R,ir:harcl Alexander (1986). indirecrt
rcciprocitl ' .  ' lvhicir ' involves reputation and status. ancl results in ever]'one in the
group continuall l 'being assessed and reassessed'. pla1.s an essent,ial roie in hurrtan
sitcieties. Alexander argues that s1'sterns tif inclirect reciprocitl' are the basis of
nloral svsterrs. (For a disserrting opiniorr. sce the message from the Pope, 1997).
Such scerrarios have been corrsiclered b1'game theorists. In Bo1'cl ancl Ric:hcrson
(1989) it is assumed that individuals interact in loops such that a cooperative actiort
can be returnecl. after several steps. to the original clonor. Ar:corcling to Bo1'd and
Richersorr t ircir rnodel is unlikelv to lead to a (iooperative outcome. as it requires the
loops to be relativel) 'small. closecl. anci long-lasting. Irr Binmore's Furt and Gantes'
(1992), the principle of inclirect reciprocitl ' is pithil l- resumöcl as 'I u'on't sr:ratch
1.our back if vou q'on't scratch their backs'. Binmore nioclels this bv irnaginlng
a rvorld in u'hidr there are onlv trl'o people alive at an)' stage. a tnother ancl lier
daughter. rvith the daughter able to provide support to her mother.
The rnodel consiclered bl' I'Iol,ak ancl Sigrnund (1998a) is morc in the tracli-
t ion of evolutiorrar)' game theorn'. Consider a population of irrdivicluals havirig the
options of helping another or not. In each gerreratiorr. a nurnbcr of potential dcittor-
recipient pairs are chosen randomh': as before. this implies a cost ( ' to the clonrtr. if
the help is actually' provided. ancl a benefit ö to the recipient. Furtircrmore. provid-
ing help incrcases the donor's scorc bv one. n'l iereas the score of a pla1'er e{lsirig to
help is decreased bv one. (Note that the score has nothing to do 'with the pa1'off.)
Init iall i 'al l scores are zero. \\ 'e consitler strategies gilen l,r ' irrtcgels k: a plaver u'ith
sucir a strategl' helps if and onlf if the score of the potential recipierit is at least
A. \\'e can follo',r. the frequencies of tlic strategies from gcncration to generatiorl.
allowing for occasional mutations.
A remarkabh' small nurnber of interactions carr lcacl to the emergencc of co-
operat ive populat ions u ' ' l iere most  mcrt t l ters use A'= 0 c l r  Ä: :  -1 ( for  b:10 and
c: 1, an averagc of tu'o interactions per i i fctirne suffices). If the simulation is
contirruerl. strategies u'hich are lcss discriniinating spreracl: pla1'ers rvith A'- -5.
for instance. rvil l  rarelv ever refuse to help. their score n'i l l  thcreforc increase faster
than ar.erage. and hence thev wil l irr turn be helpecl morc ofterr. But if ther fr<'-
querrc.-v of less discriminating pial 'ers reaches a certain thrcshold" thett defectors
(players q,ith Ä : 5. for instarrcc. r ', 'ho practicallr- never provide help) take ovcr.
so that cooperation disappears in the population. Once this happens. the average
k-r'alues n'ill drop again. leading eventuallr' back to a cooperativer egime of players
rvith rnaxirnai discrimination (2.e. A : 0).
To summarize. random drift can subvert populations of discrirnirrate altmists
by indiscriminate altruists; once thcir frcqucncv is large. defectors can invacle; but
as soon as tire defectors have recluced thc proportion of indiscriminate altruists.
the discriminatc altruists cari f ight back and elirninate the defectors. Thls leads
again to a cooperative population ri'hicli is proof against <lefectors, but not against
indiscriminate altruists. etc.
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6.  The good,  the bad,  and the d iscr iminat ing
In order to obtain an anzrlr-t ic'undcrlstandirig. \\ 'F ctrn furl lrr 'r sirrrplif 'r-thc rrurrlel
(see )tJou'ak arrd Sigrnund. 1998b). so that onlr-tu'o scorcs are possible. narnelr'g
( for 'goor1 ' )  arr r l  b  ( for 'bat l ' ) .  Each p laver  has tuo i r r teract ions per  rouncl .  one
as a clonor ancl one as a recipierrt. agairrst rarr<kunlr'r:hoserr <'o-plavcrs. Thcse trvo
irrtcractions are not rvith thr: samt: <ro-pla1'r 'r. In iar:t. w('nra]'neglec't he posslbil i tr '
ttrat tri.o plar-ers i),re ever pairerl tri.ice. A pl:rr-err has score g if (ancl onlr- if) hc has
providecl hclp in thc iast rourrri. Let us c'onsiclcr a popul:rt ion u'ith tlrrcc tvpes of
strategies onlr.: tvpe 1. the irrdiscrirrrinatc altmists (n'ith frecluenc\';r"t): tvpc 2. t irc
<iefectors (nit l i  frecluenir\-12) ancl tr-pe 3. the cli-scrirrrirrate altruists (n'ith frequencr-
/s : 1- 11 - 12). Furthermorc. \\ 'c assunie thtit in thc first rourrcl. cl iscrirninators
irssumer that ther co-plaver has scole g. It is ensl'to see thät P;(1). the parof{ i irr
tvpe i irr the first rourr<l. is gilerrr lx'
A (1)  -  - t :  + 0( . r ' r  *  . r ' : r )
P '2 ( I )  : 0 ( . r ' r  + . r ' , ; )
:rnd
f r (1 )  :  - c  f  b ( ; r 1  + . r : 3 ) .
In  the n- th rouncl  (u, i th  n > 1)  i t  is
P r ( n )  :  - c * ä ( r ' 1  * . r 3 )
P2 ( r t )  :  [ x ,
arrrl
Pr (rr ) : (b - c) (;r1 + , ',T -' 12 )/ (.r:1 * .r:2 ).
If there is orrlv one rounci per gcncratiorr. thcrr defectors n'in. oln'iouslr-. This is
no longcr tl ic casc if there are -\i rouncis. ivith -\ > 1. Tlu'total pa1-<tffs P, ':
4 ( 1 )  + . . .  +  e ( X )  a r c  g i v c r r  l x '
4 :  , \  l - , ' *  0( . r '1  +. r r ) ]
P: : NÜ.r:r * 0r'1 .
4 :  N (b  r )  * . r 1 l _ .b+  ! - : - ( 1+ : r1  + . . .  + r , i - ' - I ) l
-  I - 1 : r
Let us no\\ ' assurne thtrt t l ie frt 'cluenci<'s .i:r of thc three stratcgics cr-olr 'c urrclcr thc
ar:tion of sele<'tion. .,r ' i th glol 't ir ratcs gi\-c'n 1x-thc rl i ffcrerncc betn-t 'en their parrrff
4  and the averagc P:  I r , ,4 .  Thi r  v ie l r ls  thc rcpl icator  ec luat ion
. i . , :  r , 1 p ,  _  p l
on thc unit simplcx spannerl lrr- the tlr lee unit \-ectors er of t lx'stan<lzrlrl l tase.
This e'c|-ration ltas no fi1er[ ptrint u'ith al].r ' ; ) l). ]renc'e the three tvpcs ciurrrot
t ' t>exis t  in  the long run.  The f ixcd points are thc point  F23 n ' i th . r1 :0: inc1
r :3 +. .  f  . i r f ' - t  :  c l (b-  r ' ) .  as u 'e l l  as a l l  thc poi r r ts  orr  thc cr lgc e le3.  Hencer i r r  thc
alrsertc<' of clefectors. all niixturcs of rl iscrirrrirrate an(l irrclist 'r irnirrzrte altruists arc
fixecl poirrts.
Thc or '<. ra l l  c l t 'namics can be tnost  casi l r 'descrr ibecl  i r r  th< '< 'as<' -Y:2 (see Fig.
{). Thc paralltt l  to t}rc t 'r lge e1e2 througir F2.; is invariarrt. It consists of :rn orbit
u,ith *'- l inrit F23 alrd o-l imit F13. This orbit / ixrts as a scparatrix. All orbits on
one sidc of I con'n'erge to e2. This means that if therc arc too fcu'cliscrirrrirratitrg
altruists. i.e. if 13 < c:l(b - c) . thcrr defectors takc over. On the other sirle o1 i.
1 1 1
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Frc;r 'nl .  -1. Thc pt4tulat ion t1r 'rrairr ics of r l is<'r ' i rrr lrratc aI l(1 in(1is-
r : r i r r r inä tc  a l tn r is ts  an< l  dc f< ' t ' to rs  (s ( ' ( '  t cx t ) .
a l l  o r | i t s  con \1 ' r 'ge  to  t l r t ' r ' r lgc  e1e3.  T l r t ' l i r r r i t  po i r r t  l i< 's  sc t t t t c 'n ' l t c rc  be tn 'cen  e3
a1< l  F .  t [e  p6 i r r t  f  i t [ . r3  :2 r ' lb .  L i  th is  casc .  the  r le f 'e< ' t< t rs  a re  t ' l i n t ina tc<1.  t i r r r l  a
ur ix tu re  o f  a l tn r is ts  sc ts  es ta l ) l i she(1 .
T i r i s  1 r 'a< ls  to  an  in te ' rcs t ing  l rc l tav io ru .  Suppose tha t  thc  so<t ie t1 '< 'ons is ts  l t t -
t l rerlr- 6f altruists. Dcpencl irrg on t l lc freclt t<'n<'r- .r3 of t l is< r ' imit i i i tors. t l le statc is
giyetl  14- a p<tirrt  orr t lu ' f ixerl  poirrt  t ' r lge e1e3. \ \ i ' rrrar- ( 'xl)cct that rancltxrr r lr i f t
r r rak<ts  the  s ta tc  f lu< ' tua te  ak tng  th is  t ' r lg t 'a r r t l  tha l  f r t l t t r  t i t t t t ' t< l  t i l l l t r .  l l l u t i l t i t ' 11
introt|rces a srtrni l  qutrrrt i tr-  12 of ( lefcctors. \ \-hat happt'ns'/  I f  the state is lrctn'el<lt t
F13 ar rc l  e1 .  the  c le fec ' to rs  r i ' i l l  take  or -e r .  I f  t l re 's ta tc  i s  l r t ' tn 'een e j  a l l c l  F .  thev  r i - i l l
inrru<'f l i i . r tc1r 'be sckr<:te<l i tgairrst.  arr<l protttpt l l  r-ätt i-sl t .  But i f  a t t t i r tor i tv of <lelcc'-
tr trs ir tr-acles 1'hi le thc stäte is lretu-ccrt F arr<l F13. sontct l t i t tg strtr t tg<'htrprpt lns.  ^\ t
f i rst.  thc <lcfult6rs thri le orr t lu. i trr l iscrinrirrntc altruists atrt l  i r tcreasc' ir t  t i ' r 'c l . icttr '1 ' .
But t |erebr' .  thev r lcplett ,  thc' ir  rcsorlr( ' ( , .  t l rc indiscrint i t tatc altr t l ist-s. Al icr sotrt t l
t inrt ' .  the r l isr.r ' i rrr inatc'altnrists takc or-er ' ;r t tr l  c ' l inr inatc thc t lefe<'ts1-s. Thc poprt-
la t ion  re tn r ls  t6  th< ' t ' r lge  e1e13.  l l r t  r ro r r ' so t t t t ' n - l te t< ' l t t ' t r r t t ' t t  e1  : In i l  F .  n 'hcrc  th t '
rat i<t of r i is<rr irnirrate't<t irr i l iscl irrr inatc altnrists is stt  large that clefct ' tors ( 'al t  l lo
lg r rqer  i r1 -ar l< ' .  Thq< l t ' fec ' to rs  havc  cxper icn t t ' t l  a  Pvr rh i< ' r - i< ' to r r ' .  Ther i r  on l r 'hope
is  t |a t  f lu< ' t r - ra t io t rs  n ' i l l  c len tua l l r - t l cc rcase th< ' f requer rc r '< t {  c l i s< ' r i r r t i r ta to rs  aga in .
Thcr -ha lc  t r t  $ 'a i t  un t i l  thc  s ta t t ' i s  l re t$ ' r ' c r r  F1 ;1  i t l l t l  e1 .  For  th is .  the  f lu< ' tua t ions
1r1r'r :  to c'ross t lre gap lrctn-een F r int l  F13. This t i tkes sotn<'t irne. I f  de{t 'r ' tors trr '
too of iett  to i t tr-a<lt ' .  thcr- r l ' i l l  t t t ' r ' t ' r  succet 'r l .
This lr t 'har- ir) l l r  corr( 'sl)olrr ls prccisel l  to t lrc os<' i l lat iotts olrst 'rvcr1 in t l ie l l l l l lx)r-
ir .al sir lulat iotrs ni lh the rnrtrc sopir ist icatt ' r l  rno<lel ( lr-her<'t1te s<:ole Ä'<'art take attr '
intege'r r-alue). Lrtng petr iorls of crtopreration art ' tc 'r ' t r t i tui tet l  t- l ten t lrc t i t ' t l t tcttct ' , , f
i rrr l is<'r ir l i rrate altnrists bccomes too largc: thi-s is l t l lnre'r l iate:h- f t l l lor i-ct l  bv a sharp
inc.reast ' i rr  thc nr-rrrrb<,r ol cl<.f<'<' tors. \ext. th<'se t lcf<'<'t t) IS i l re r ' l i rnirratt '<l  1x't l ie
r l ist ' r i rrr ir tators. trrtr l  thort artt>t l tcr long l lcr io<l of ct loperati t l rr  l r<'gins.
7. Know your partner
So für rr-e havt '  assumt:cl that ä11 plavcrs ktrol l  cac:h other's st 'ore. This is rrot
real ist ic" <tf corrrsc'.  Everr in srrräl l  groups. u-i tcrt '  al l  r t tetrt l ters ktrr lu'  e:rc' l t  t l t l icr
l 'el l .  thcre must lre'nrarn' intcractions that i l re I Iot rratrrhetl  l tv et 'ert 'orte. \ \ :c tnust
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assume that plarvers can ltave different scores in the cy'es of differerrt co-players. If
rve corrsider numerical simulations l'n'here an interaction ]tetu,een tno inclivicluals
is obsern'ed by a ranclom subset of the other indit'iduals. arrd assume that onll-
t l iese 'on-lookers' ltave the possibil i t l . to update their perceptiorr of the rlonor's
image score. the infornation is contained in a matrix u,hose elements s;; denotc
the irnage score of plaver i as seen bv plaver j. In a rlorror-recipient interaction
betrveen j and r,. plal 'er j u,i l l  cooperate if si i ) ki. If j  has no lnforrnation on i
then s; ;  :  0 .
The model rrolv depends on the probabil it l-that a given incliviclual observes an
interaction betll'een tu'o other individuals. \\'e find again that r:ooperation can easily
be establisher.l and dorninate the population. but a larger number of irrteractions per
generation is rreeded. For larger 
€iroups. it is rnore diff icult to establish coopcration.
because the fraction of individuals that obtain inforrnatiorr about any particular
interaction rvil l  be srrraller. Therefore. more interactions are rcquired (rclati i 'e tcr
group size) irr order to discriminate against defectors.
\\'e can investigate this anallticalll-b1' extending the prer.ious tw'o-scorc niodel.
Lct us assume that in each rounrl. a plal'er can be ilonor or recipient .ll'ith tlie same
probabilitl' I I 2. and that q is the probabilitl' that a given incliviclual knou's the
score of a randomlv chosen opponent. A discrirninator u'iro does not knon. the
score of t ire r:o-plaver u,i l l  assume u,ith probabil ity 1 that this score is g. rf g,
dcnotes the frequencv of g-scorers in the population in rouncl z. and;r:1n(n). r2n(n)
and r3g(n) arc the frequcncies of g-scoring indiscriminate altruists. unconditional
defectors resp.  d iscr iminators in  rouncl  n.  then c lcar lv  r : rs(n) :  r r  äod x2s(n)  :
(l l2)r2n(n - 1). sirrcer a clefector is q'ith probabil itv 1/2 irr the role of a dongr and
then unmasks himself. Therefore
x2s@) :  h
The score of a discriminator remairrs uncharrged if hc is a recipient. If he is a
potential donor. he wil l either knolv the co-plal 'cr (rl ' i th probabil it l '  q) and help
if the co-pla1'er has score q (as happens u'ith probabil it l '9,-1). or clse he g'i1l
rtot knou' the co-plavers scorc. ancl hr:lp. Sirrce this lattetr alternative hcilcls 'n'itir
probabil itr. 1 - q. this viclds
r3e (n )  :  ( l l 2 ) x3o f t r  -  1 )  +  ( I l 2 ) r s ( l  -  q  +  qg , r_ r ) .
Since 9, ,  :  r rs(n)  - l  r2nQt)  * ; r3, (n) .  i t  fo l lows that
l Jn  :  . l L r t - ,  *  l f  t ,  - t  t  L  -  q ) r : r  )
iv i th  s :  (1 + Su)12.  This recurrer . . " . i tu , rnn impl ies ( together  wi th g l  :1)  that
-  Q" r r  ,n -1  - r ' ,
Y r r  - \  ö  t  I  T
z  t - q x j
1 1  * ( 1  - q ) r 3
r - q r z
The pa1'off for the indiscrirninate altruists in round n is
P1(n)  = - ( r :12)  + (b l2)( r  t  + r t ) .
The payoff P2(n) for the unconclit ional defectors depends on their score. Tirose
rvith score b receive b(*t + (I - q)lr3)12 and thcise with score g in additiort qbr3f2.
so that
P2 (n ' ) :  ( b12 )14  +  (1  -  Q ) r s  +  t sQ( rzsh ) l r ) l
L -11
F i r r a l h - . a c l i s c r i m i n a t o r r e < r e i r " c s l - r ( q g , , + 1 - s )  * Ö r r * , 1 - q ) f u 3 ) l 1 2 i f h e h a s
sc:orc 0. antl irr äcicllt iorr bqr.l l2 if he has scorc'g. so that u'c obtailr
P : ( r r )  : - ( r : f 2 ) ( q 0 , , + l - d + ( , b 1 2 ) ( t ' t + . r r ) - f t 1 2 ) q r 3 l I - ( . r , r ; r ( r i ) / r : 3 ) ] .
Instc;rd of assurrring a fixctl numbcr of rounds per gcn<tratiorr. le:t us stlppose that
it is a ranclom variable. If n'e assurrre for instance titat u' ( 1 is t l ie probäbil it l '
fctr a furthcr routrd. thcrr thc,total pitvofl fol tr 'pe i is givorr lr l Pi - !Pirrr". A
straiglitforu,ard cornputatiotr slron's that th<' phase portrait of the corr<:sponcling
replic.ator equation i i : .r,(P; - P) looks as bcfore. The scparatix 1 is ncit-given br'
; r11 :6; ( ) -u ' ) f  bu 'q.  In  one rerg iorr .  a l l  orb i ts  convcrEle to e2.  i .e .  defectors takc over .
In t[e other rcgign. ä1] orlt lts ( 'orrvcrge to a point on the cdge e1e3 n'hich rlepencls
orr the irrit ial I 'alue. Lr particr-rltrr. altrui-srlt can onll 'gct e-stablished if
q ) cllt
q' l i ich kroks exa<'tlr '  l ike H:rmilton's rulc. except th:rt thc coefficicrrt of relatcdness is
rsplacerl bv rvhat wc rntl\ '<'all a coeffit ' i t 'nt of accluaintattc'eship. l.r:. the probaiti l i tr '
that ai plaver knorvs the score of thc ccl-plar-er. If this crtnclit ion holds. then thct
a\-erag('rnirrrlrer of rountls pcr generatiott. i .r:. l f (I- tr '). rnust e'xccetl (bq+t:) l(bq-c).
It is only in this case that in a populatiolr consistirrg of clefec'tors anci t l iscriminators.
the rl iscrirnirrating strategv is stairle.
8.  Discussion
It shoultl also be metntiorre<l t irat this tl iscrinriniitor stri l tcgf is relatccl to. ltrtt
cl iffcrernt f i 'orn the'71-strategl-proposerl lrv Sugclt 'n (1986). Irr Sugclen's rnoclel. in
ca(ih roun(l a rarr<lornlr- <'hose.rr plar-er lrc-e(ls l lclp. ancl e'aclr of the other plat'crs can
pror-iclc sotne irelp (thus the necdv plar-er calr get as pavoff (rn - 1)Ü. nltere rrt is t lte
grorrp size). Sugclerr's l- strategr-is basecl orr thc concept of good stortding. jttst
as irr t lre <:zrse of rl irecrt rcciprocation. Plavers are bortt n' it ir a gootl starrtl irrg. ancl
kecp i t  long; is  thcr .help a l i  ner :c l r 'p lavcrs u, i th  good stanr l i r rg.  I f  not .  thcr ' lose
thcir good starrclir ig. Sug<lcrr argrles that such a stratcg)'c'ati n'ork as tr l lasis for an
insurance prin<'iplc rr ' i thin the population. \\e stri:ss that a plartr can keep his goo<l
stanrling bv rcfusing to hetlp someone of harl standing. n'hercas itt our moclel. he
ri-oulcl loser his t/-score n'h<.ncver he refuses lielp. cvcn if tlio potctttral recipierrt is a
0-scorer. Sug<letn's Ir stratcgr-is nrorc sopli isticatc<1. but l ikc cTFT. it is vulnerable
to errofs i r r  pcrcept ion (scc Boer l i js t  c t  a \ . .1997).  I f  i r r format ion is  incornplete.  then
a plaver olrservc<l rvhile .,r ' i thholcling his hclp nrav ber ttt isrtrtclerstood: hc rrial ' htur:
<lefr.<'ted on a plar'<'r 'n' it lr goocl standirrg. or punishe<l sorn('otlc ri ' i t lr lratl starrcling.
Arr e'r-entual crror ctat] sprcatl. The clis<'rirrrirrator rult: is less detmartditrg on thc
plaver's nrcrrtal c'apabil it ies.
\krlalisti<r zrggrcssiorr. social rrorrns äncl feelings of fairncss arr<l soliclalitr '  l tave
e\.ol\r)d irr horninicl groups in order to rnall i lgc the <'orrrplex sttr: ial relati<tns ri ' i thirt
thcir families. baurls ancl tribcs (Ridlev. 1996). Hurnan decisions arrcl activit ies are
rrot onlv guirlc<l br- econorrric consicleratious. lrut tcl t i  large extent ltv a cttmplcx
irousehold of crrrotions. Thcsc eniclt ioris arrci passious art 't l tcrttselves the outcome of
biologi<'al nt:ccssities. ln partic'r.rlal th<r ncccl for ciivisiorr ol lü]rcir antl {ttr ( 'oopcration.
The rvav of l i fc of the first horninicls enterirrg tirc. sar-:rnnah <licl not allorl '{br autarchr'.
but requirecl a highlr.a<läpte.cl social l i fe bascci on rccipr'or:atittrt artt l att intt-rnalizecl
svstcni of nurrns a natural larl '  in the {ullest sensc.
K.\RL SIG\IT-\L)
THE SOC]I.\L LIFtr OF AL TO\I,\T,\
The importance of tra<lirrg ac'ts of nmtual rrssistau('e lras beren recognizerl i- lr
a verr\' long time \\'e nra\- fincl it. for irrstarrcc. in Davicl Hunier's lrook on Hurrt,o,n
I'{ature (17a0): ' I lcarrr to clo serr-ice to anothcr. ri i thout be'tir irrg hirn arn'rcal
kinrlness: because I fbresee that her ni1l return nrl ser'\ ' ir 'c. irr cxpectation of airothcr
of t l le sarrrc kind. I lbresee that he u,i l l  rctunr rrrl sr,Lr-lr 'e. in exlre1 ;11jsn of anclther
of the same kincl. an<l in orcler to maintain the. sanre corresporr<lence of goo(1 officcs
'n'ith nre artd, oth,ers fitalics aclclcd]. \rrrl ar:<'orrl inglr-. after I have setved ]rirrr:rnd hc
is ln posserssion of the advarrtrl€lc arisirrSi frorn mr- a('tiorr. hc is irrclucecl to perfolrn
his part. as foreseeing the corrscqucnccs of his re'f irsai. '
An even oldcr {brrnulation of t ire principle of irrdirec't reciproc'ation <:an be founcl
in the bibii<:a} injunctiorr 'Gile anrl to rrtu it shall be given .
It mav u'ell be that indircct rcclprocatiorr norks in othcl spct:i<'s. \ lrop<,ful
carrdidatc is the Arabian babblcr. Zahavi (i99;) nreutiorrs that inclivit luals oftcrr
compete rvith cach other. jostl ing for thr: rolc o1 :r rlonor. Thev interfere s'ith the
helping of others in feeclirrg thc nt:stl ings. in allo{eeclirrg }rctt-t 'cn aclults. in scntincl
activit les. irr rnobbirrg ancl in the ri irf i :nser of the c'onrnion te:rl i torr'. -\s Zahar-i notes.
this is clif{ icult to irttt 'rpret itr tcrtrrs,,f kirr sck'ction. gror-rp selection ur (<lirect)
reciprocation. If thc bcrrcfic' iarv gert-s help frorrr sornooli€r elsc. so nruch for the
better. it n'ould seeni. But if helpirrg is a rncans lbr raisirrg olte s score. r 'ompetit i<tn
fbr being the one nho gives help rnakes per{ect -st:nse.
\\ 'e carrriot exper:t t irat clircct an<i irrrl irec't rcciprocatiorr arc aln'ar-s n'el1 sep-
arated. Alexandcr (1987) r.iervs iricl irerct rcciprocit\- 'as a ('onsequen(ie of clirect
rt:c' iprocitl '  occurring in the preserrce, of intcrcst<.<l :uri l ierrces groups of inclir-iduals
rr'ho continualh'evaluatc thc rrrernlrers of theil socictv as possilrle future irrtera<:-
tants'. The smooth transition frorn clirer:t o lntl ircct rr '<:ipror:itv is ncath'<'apturecl
in Poilo<rk and Dugatkin (1992). n'ho str-rcli<'cl cl ircct rec'ipro<'atiorr irr the usuii l con-
text of the repeated Prisoner's Dilcrnrrra ancl alkrn'c<l thc plalcrs to oc'c'asionallr-
obscrve a co-plavcr before' ,strirt ing the rc.pc:itcrl interaction. Thcv anallzcrl :r strat-
egv called Observer Tit For Trit (oTFT). If thi: future co-plalcr \\ 'as sccn <lcfcctiug
irr his last interrac:tion. thcn oTFT pres<:ri lrts to rlcfect irr the first rourrrl. Polloc'k
and Dugatkin r',,ere nrostlt '  irtorostiug iu lomp:rrirrg this stratcgr- rr ' i th thc usua.l
TFT. anc'l shorve<l that it is not aln'ar-s ailvarrtagcous. This seerrrs r-nplisi l ig ät
a first glance rvhv shciulcl atlr l i t iorrnl irrforrrratioir be a harrdicap'l Thc rc'asorr is
that the corlclusion tlran'tr bv oTFT is not al\\ 'avs approplriate. A plaver läst seen
riefectlng can be a clefector. br-rt r '<xrkl also be a TFT plar-r'r punishing a <lefector'.
in ri.hich case the nerv interactirxr starts n'ith thc \\ 'r 'or)g rrruve. But Pollo<:k anrl
Dugatkin also rcrnarked that oTFT nral- be bcttur t ible to itn.äcle a resiclerrt pop-
ulation of clefectors (triz. ri ' l th a srnaller init ial c' lustcr). antl that it c:arr bc'stable
agairrst defectors r'herr TFT is rrot. Thev ä1so stressr:rl that the probäbil itv of fu-
ture ettcottttters arrxrrrg spec:if ic'plar-ers engaged in an iteraterl Prisoner's Dilcrrrrna
gamc rl la\-irr principle clecline to zero. rl.r:. that oTFT carr ho1<i ts ou-rr ngii irrst
de fe r ' t o r s  n ' l r o t r  n , r  deg ree  o [  l u tu l r .  i r r t oLa l t i . l r  \ \ ' i l l r  t l r o  ,  r t l l o l t  l ) a r l l l ' l  \ \ ' i l r  ] ) I r ' -
sumed. In this case. oTFT rerluces prcciscll '  to the <lisrrrirrrirrator stratcgr'. Tli i-s
shorvs that a gradual transition frorrr rl irer:t to incllrec't recipro<:zit iorr carr learl to
the establishrrrerrt of a rl is<'r ' ini inating strategv b:rsecl irnage sc'ores.
The simple thoughr experirnerrts pcrformccl Lrr- nrearrs of autornata shon- that
self-assernbll 'can leacl to rurrrns ernforc'ing coopelation. lroth through intt 'rnalization
of fair and tolerant rules b1'means of inrrcl statcs uncl through soc'ial pressulc bascrl
on one's stanrling ü.ithirr thc communitr-.
